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Tipton: Florida's Automobile Guest Statute

FLORIDA'S AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE
S. VIcToR TriroN*

During the late 'twenties and 'thirties a practice known as hitchhiking became prevalent on the American highways., As a result of
occasional robberies, and sometimes even murder, committed by hitchhikers against their driver-hosts, considerable adverse publicity2 and
feeling developed toward hitchhiking. Many states passed laws
attempting - for the most part unsuccessfully - to abolish the practice. 3
Another type of legislation growing out of hitchhiking was the
"guest statute." 4 Sometimes an automobile which had picked up a
hitchhiker would be involved in an accident and the hitchhiker
would sue the driver-host because of the hiker's alleged injuries.
Again, unfavorable publicity and public feeling resulted. It was for
the most part depression time, and many drivers did not have liability
insurance. However, many of the drivers who were sued did have it.
With "don't let these hitchhiker-beggars bite the hands that feed
them" as the substance of their rallying cry, the liability insurance
companies promoted the passage of "guest statutes." These statutes
provided, in effect, that an automobile guest who had not paid for the
transportation could not recover damages from the host or owner in an
action based upon the negligent operation of the automobile unless
it had been operated with gross negligence or wanton and willful
misconduct, or the like.8 Thus legal proof of a much more

OLL.B. 1937, University of Missouri; Member of Missouri and Orlando, Florida,
Bars.
'N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1935, sec. X, p. 1, col. 4; Letter to author from John H.
King, Law Clerk of Standing Judiciary Committee of Connecticut General Assembly
1927-37.
2N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1935, sec. X, p. 1, col. 4, is an example. According to the
N. Y. Times Index, in the first half of 1930 there were nine articles or editorials in
that newspaper alone reflecting unfavorably on hitchhiking.
35 Am. JuL., Automobiles and Highway Traffic §492 (1956).
4ALPxRT, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LAw §80 (1958); Georgetta, The Major
Issues in a Guest Case, 1954 INs. L.J. 583; Note, 5 LA. L. REv. 488 (1954); N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1930, p. 26, Col. 6. See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1447 (1951).
IGeorgetta, supra note 4; Comment, 5 KAN. L. REv. 722 (1957); Notes, 5 UTAH
L. REv. 257, 258 (1956), 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1951); Comment, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q.
254, 255, n.8.
6SA AM. JUR., Automobiles and Highway Traffic §511 (1956). The exact lan-

[287]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1958], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

difficult degree and type was required than in the ordinary case in
which only simple negligence had to be proved.
Connecticut, in 1927, became the first state to pass a guest statute.7
This legally complex and far-reaching enactment aimed at hitchhikers was drafted by nonlawyers; due to an unprecedented fluke it
was not even referred to or studied by the legislative judiciary committee, composed of lawyers, most of whom would probably have opposed the measure." After ten years Connecticut repealed the statute, 9
in spite of the governor's veto, 10 but not before many other states had
passed similar laws. Ultimately slightly more than one half of the states
of the Union enacted such legislation. Although twenty-seven states
now have guest statutes, all of them were enacted between 1927 and
1939.11 Of course in seeking such statutes the insurance companies

usually were represented by well-organized, well-financed and effective
lobbyists, while the unorganized and unknown injured persons of the
future had no lobbies or agents at all.
Had the guest statutes applied only to bums, beggars, hitchhikers
and other such strangers to the driver, comparatively little, if any,
injustice might have resulted. Unfortunately, however, the number
of deserving injured persons adversely affected by these laws has far
exceeded the comparatively small number of the undeserving kind.
Many of these injured persons have been more of a benefactor to
their drivers than the drivers were to them, in spite of the fact that
at the moment the drivers were technically hosts and the injured
persons were technically guests.
In 1937, the very year in which Connecticut, where it all started,
repealed its guest statute, a proposed guest statute was introduced in
the Florida Senate by the then Senator F. P. Parker of Mayo. 12 It
appears to have been sponsored in the House by the then Representaguage varies. In a few states even greater fault is required. 60 C.J.S., Motor
Vehicles §399 (3) (1949). In Massachusetts and Georgia gross negligence is required
by court decisions without applicable guest statutes. 5A Ass. JuR., supra §498.
7Georgetta, supra note 4.
8Letter from John H. King, supra note 1.
9Conn. Laws, Supp. 1937, c. 270, §351d; see Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3
A.2d 839 (1939).
10Letter to author from Muriel A. Naylor, Connecticut State Legislative Reference Librarian.
"Comments, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 390 (1952), 5 MD. L. REV. 406 (1941), 55 MIri.
L. REv. 1197 (1957). The Marquette article fails to list 27 states. It overlooks Mich.,
Iowa, and Ala., all of which had passed guest statutes before 1939.
12FLA. S. JOUR. 41

(1937).
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tive George E. Holt of Miami. 3 It was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the day it was introduced 4 and was reported
out favorably by that committee the next day with only one day's
study.'- It passed the House with two minor amendments. It passed
the Senate after that body first adopted the jury trial amendment,
proposed by the then Senator Philip D. Beall, Sr., of Pensacola.'r
The jury trial amendment was subsequently adopted by the House.
The statute now reads as follows:
"320.59 Liability to guest or passenger.-No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation,
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner
or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or
willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of
such motor vehicle, and unless such gross negligence or willful
and wanton misconduct was the proximate cause of the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought; provided, that
the question or issue of negligence, gross negligence, and willful
or wanton misconduct, and the question of proximate cause,
and the issue or question of assumed risk, shall in all such cases
be solely for the jury; provided that nothing in this section
shall apply to school children or other students being transported to or from schools or places of learning in this state."
JUDICIAL HISTORY: LEGAL PROBLEMS, CONFUSION, AND INJUSTICES

The judicial history of this statute in Florida since its adoption
has been one of endless confusion, litigation, and injustices to injured
persons, and some attorneys have called it "the worst legal monstrosity on the statute books." A study of this history will almost cause
one to feel sympathy for the Florida Supreme Court because of the
difficulties in attempting to interpret and enforce this peculiar law.
One of the first and most confusing decisions was that upholding
the general validity of the statute. Only a very few years earlier
13FLA. H.R. JouR. 156 (1937).
14FLA. S. JouL 41 (1937).
'5FLA. S. JouR. 44 (1937).
16FLA. S. JouR. 95 (1937).
17McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942).
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the Court had held in Williams v. Jacksonville-8 that a statute which
became part of the Jacksonville city charter was void in so far as it
limited suits against the city to those arising out of gross negligence.
It did so on the ground that such a restriction conflicted with the
provision in the state constitution that every person should have a
legal remedy for an injury done him and also because the term gross
negligence was too difficult to interpret and apply.19 In later upholding the guest statute 20 the Court did not attempt to distinguish
or reconcile its ruling with that in the Williams case.
In ordinary negligence cases, the complaint need only allege negligence in broad, general terms- usually one short sentence. 21 Thereafter, and before trial, the plaintiff's lawyer can use the discovery
processes of the court, such as the taking of depositions, to learn and
legally establish all the facts in the case. The Florida Supreme Court
has held, however, that under the guest statute the complaint must
set forth in advance and in detail the facts constituting the gross
negligence or wanton and willful misconduct-and, moreover,
that the facts stated must show this degree of fault "with reasonable
certainty." 22 Otherwise, the trial judge has a duty to rule against the
guest without hearing testimony and without submitting the case to
a jury." This was declared to be true despite the statute's provision
that "in all cases" it would be "solely" for the jury to determine the
issue of gross negligence or wanton and willful misconduct. Moreover, even if the case were submitted to a jury, the trial judge, or the
Supreme Court itself in the event of an appeal, could later overrule
18118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935).
19See Price and Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 330, 339
(1953); 38 AM. JUR., Municipal Corporations §680 (1941).
2OMcMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942). In Ludwig v. Johnson,
243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), the Kentucky guest statute was declared to be
in conflict with a similar constitutional provision and was held invalid. See also
Noakes v. Gaiser, 315 P.2d 183, 185 (Colo. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
21Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947); Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla.
685, 193 So. 767 (1940); see Form 31, 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. 176

(1956).

22Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940). However, later cases appear to have modified the "reasonable certainty" part of these requirements. See
statements to the effect that doubtful cases should be submitted to the jury:
Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957); Thompson v. Bennett, 42 So.2d 583
(Fla. 1949). See also indications that only "something more than ordinary negligence" need be shown in the complaint and at the trial: Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d
679 (Fla. 1955); Erlichstein v. Roney, 155 Fla. 333, 20 So.2d 254 (1944).
2"Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
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the jury on this question and in effect reverse its verdict.24
In other words, the Supreme Court called the jury trial provision
"surplusage" and held that the provision could not change the traditional power of courts or juries.25 It is. arguable, to say the least, that
the legislature would never have passed the guest statute without the
jury trial amendment; but instead of voiding the whole statute the
Court ruled in effect that the invalidity of this amendment did not
affect the legality of the remainder of the enactment. Strangely
enough, the Court still gives occasional lip service to the principle
that the issue of gross negligence is solely for the jury; 26 but, since
the Court does not really mean this,27 such statements only serve to
28
create confusion.
In the ordinary negligence case the plaintiff need only prove
his case at the trial by a fair preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence. The Court held, however, in the first cases before it under
the guest statute, that at the trial the guest had to present "con2
clusive proof" of gross negligence or wanton and willful misconduct. 9
After some confusion the Court later ruled that the word conclusive
as used in this particular connection meant only a fair preponderance
of the evidence.30 But the confusion on this point has by no means
31
vanished.
In the ordinary negligence case, if the plaintiff and the other
eyewitnesses, if any, to the negligence are killed or made victims of
amnesia, the plaintiff's widow, children or estate can nevertheless
recover damages under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if the physical
facts are such as to give rise to an inference or supposition that the
driver was negligent. The Supreme Court has held, however, that
this doctrine does not apply to cases under the guest statute.32 Thus,
24Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565 (1942).
25Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941).
26Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1954). See also Welch v. Moothart, 89
So.2d 485 (Fla. 1956); Clements v. Deeb, 88 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1956); Schneider v.
Saxon, 82 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1955).
27Bolick v. Sperry, 88 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1956); Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla.
1955).
28See 2 FLA. LAW & PRAc., Automobiles and Other Vehicles §67 (1958).
29Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940); O'Reilley v. Sattler, 141
Fla. 770, 193 So. 817 (1940).
3OAyers v. Morgan, 42 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1949).
2
3 See Ling v. Edenfield, 211 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1954).
32 McGinley v. Chancey, 70 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1954); Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 373, 25
So.2d 870 (1946); O'Reilley v. Sattler, supra note 29.
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if an automobile guest and all passengers and eyewitnesses are killed
in the accident, the surviving family of the guest is "out of luck."
Since the more grossly negligent the driver the more likely the
passengers are to be killed, the plaintiff is left at another unjust
disadvantage. Moreover, in view of the Supreme Court's repeated
statement in cases under the guest statute that "gross negligence or
any degree of negligence may be determined by the consequences of
one's conduct as well as the conduct itself,"3

the Court's ruling that

res ipsa loquitur cannot apply to guest statute cases adds another item
of confusion to the application of this enactment.
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that excess speed alone,
no matter how great, can never justify recovery of damages under
the guest statute.3 4 However, the Court has held that excessive speed
alone can justify a criminal conviction of manslaughter.35 Thus,
proof of a greater degree of the driver's misconduct is required for
an injured person to recover damages in a civil suit from a driver's insurance company than is required to brand the driver as a felon and
a criminal, permanently remove his voting and other important rights
of citizenship, and send him to the penitentiary for as long as twenty
years 136
Although the legislature apparently intended that the statute
apply only to passengers being transported free, the Supreme Court
has held that the statute also applies to persons who actually share
7
the expense of the trip in questionA.
In 1951 the Supreme Court held that although each separate act
of the driver might not in and of itself establish gross negligence, it
was sufficient if the acts considered collectively did so. s In 1952 it
Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 204, 4 So.2d 525, 526 (1941).
34Bolick v. Sperry, 88 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1956), and cases cited. See also Cadore v.
Karp, 91 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1957), decided in the same month and by the same division of the Court as was Johnson v. State, infra note 35.
35Johnson v. State, 92 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1957). This ruling would seem in conflict
with the earlier statement in Miller v. State, 75 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 1954), that
"culpable conduct to sustain imprisonment must be of a kind sufficient at least to
sustain an action for civil liability under our guest statute."
36FLA. STAT. §782.07 (1956). Long sentences are not infrequently imposed. The
three automobile manslaughter cases reaching the Supreme Court in the first
half of 1957, for example, involved sentences of 10, 14, and 20 years respectively.
All three convictions were approved by the high court. Johnson v. State, 92 So.2d
651; White v. State, 93 So.2d 589; Hutley v. State, 94 So.2d 815.
37Yokom v. Rodriguez, 41 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1949); McDougald v. Couey, 150 Fla.
748, 9 So.2d 187 (1942).
3sDexter v. Green, 55 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1951).
33Cormier v.
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held that eleven admitted negligent acts of the driver, all contributing to the accident, did not collectively establish gross negligence39
In 1956 and in 1957 it reiterated its original position and held that
separate acts of simple negligence considered collectively could establish gross negligence.40
In one case the Supreme Court held that the guest must prove
either an actual or a constructive intent to injure, 41 and in other cases
implicitly reiterated this principle. Although it is well established
that negligence on the part of the injured person himself in connection with a tort committed on him intentionally, willfully, wantonly,
or recklessly will not defeat his recovery of damages, 42 the Supreme
Court has ruled, and it is now unquestioned in Florida, that even
ordinary negligence on the part of the guest precludes his recovery
under the guest statute.43 Thus, no matter how grossly negligent the
driver was, if the guest failed to protest to the driver that he, the
driver, was being negligent, the guest may be found guilty of contributory negligence and his claim defeated. 44 Moreover, the defendant, differing from the guest, does not have to set forth in advance a detailed, written outline of the alleged fault of the opposing
party, but need allege it in only a few words in broad, general terms
45
in his answer.
The statute provides that in order to recover damages the guest
must prove "gross negligence or wanton and willful misconduct."
Historically, gross negligence has been considered simply a high degree of negligence. Wanton and willful misconduct, on the other hand,
has been regarded as deliberate, intentional misconduct, though no
injury need be intended. One appellate court declared that negligence and willfulness are as unmixable as oil and water, 46 and the
Florida Supreme Court itself once declared willfulness and negli39De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1952).
4oFarrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957); Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870

(Fla. 1956).
4

lOrme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946).

42Compare 5A Am. JuL, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §682 (1956), with

Deane v. Johnson, 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958).
43Henley v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953); Knudsen v. Hanlan, 160 Fla. 566,
36 So.2d 192 (1948).
44Walker v. Loop Fish & Oyster Co., 211 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1954); Knudsen v.
Hanlan, supra note 43.
45See Form 51, 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. 193 (1956).
46Kelly v. Malott, 135 Fed. 74 (7th Cir. 1905).
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gence to be "a contradiction in terms." 47 But in the first case arising
under the Florida guest statute, Division A of the Supreme Court
held that as used in this particular statute the terms gross negligence
and wanton and willful misconduct were synonymous.4 8 Two months
later Division B held that the terms were not synonymous and were
used in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive sense, and that an
automobile guest could recover upon proof of injuries resulting from
gross negligence even though wanton and willful misconduct was not
shown. 49 The terms were again held not synonymous four months
later by the Court en banc, with only two justices dissenting.50 A
year later, with three justices dissenting, the Court en banc reversed
itself again and declared the terms to be synonymous after all. s l
In other words, the word or as used in the statute did not really mean
or but meant just the opposite - and, indicating that the guest had
to prove both gross negligence and wanton and willful misconduct.
The Court offered no explanation as to why the legislature did not
use the word and if that was what it meant. Since that time the Court
has frequently reiterated the position that the terms are synonymous.
However, it has never stated whether under this principle gross negligence is raised to the level of wanton and willful misconduct - or
wanton and willful misconduct is lowered to the level of gross negligence; and, since there is nothing in the language of the statute from
which the Court can make such a choice, it can scarcely be expected to
do so. Confusion on this point necessarily remains. Like most of
the rest of the confusion, it can be removed only by repeal of the
statute.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unsuccessfully made valiant
attempts to lay down a definition broad enough to cover both gross
negligence and wanton and willful misconduct and yet definite enough
to enable trial judges and juries to determine whether a given set of
facts constitutes the required basis for the driver's liability. A few
of the definitionss2 in the chronological order in which they were first
pronounced are as follows:
47Florida Ry. &Nav. Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394, 5 So. 714 (1889).
0'Reilley v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817 (1940).
49Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 399 (1940).
soJackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940).
5
lCormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941).
52For other definitions see Cadore v. Karp, 91 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1957); Faircloth
v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1956); Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 773, 10 So.2d 417 (1942);
Cormier v. Williams, supra note 51 at 206, 4 So.2d at 527 (concurring opinion);
48
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".... a reckless disregard for human life, or that entire want of
care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or shows such wanton and reckless
indifference to the rights of others as may be equivalent to an
53
intentional violation of them ...
"[Tlhe act complained of must be of such character that the
operator of the automobile would know, or should know, that
by doing the act in the manner and at the time alleged he
54
placed others in danger of injury.'
[Note: This is substantially the same as one of the most common
definitions of ordinary negligence.]55
"... either an actual or a constructive intent to injure ....
[T]here must be, on the part of the person sought to be charged,
a conscious intent to do or omit the act in question; an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty."5 6
"... that course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent
man would know would probably and most likely result in
57
injury to persons or property."
"... a course of conduct where the danger to persons or prop8
erty is clear and imminent."5
Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 599 (1940) (approved instructions). See
also Ling v. Edenfleld, 211 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1954); Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d
131 (1941); De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 1952) (concurring
opinion).
53Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 192, 197 So. 833, 835 (1940). The Court
also declared this to be "a character of negligence . . . necessary to justify the
infliction of punitive damages." Accordingly, it would seem that such damages
should be recoverable under the guest statute whenever compensatory damages
are allowed.
4Brown v. Roach, 67 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1953); Dexter v. Green, 55 So.2d 548,
549 (Fla. 1951); McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 339, 5 So.2d 867, 870 (1942).
5538 Am. Jut., Negligence §23 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence §5 (1950).
5s6 Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 389, 25 So.2d 870, 876 (1946).
57Clements v. Deeb, 88 So.2d 505, 506 (Fla. 1956); Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d 679,
682 (Fla. 1955).
5SFarrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889, 895 (Fla. 1957). This definition was used
in a substantially different form in the earlier case of Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d
679, 682 (Fla. 1955).
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In case after case under the guest statute the trial judge has been
reversed by the Supreme Court on the subject of whether the facts
involved constituted the required misconduct. The Supreme Court
admitted almost at the beginning:5 9
"It is difficult if not impossible to define degrees of negligence
so that the distinctions made by classifications or definitions
would be even helpful in determining particular cases in litigation. Each case must be determined on its particular facts
and circumstances ......
And later the Court declared:60
"It is difficult to fix a standard by which there may be determined with precision what allegations do and what do not
present a case of gross negligence . . . and faint is the line of

demarcation between cases where ordinary negligence has been
held to exist and those where the lack of care has been declared gross."
As recently as 1955 the Court again declared:61

"From the very beginning, the courts have encountered great
difficulty in attempts to define any clear and distinct line to
separate simple negligence from gross negligence. The difficulty is inherent in the question itself because it relates to
different degrees of similar conduct."
In 1956 the Court implied that it was requiring a higher degree of
62
negligence only because it had to do so:

"[Miodern authorities are leaning to the view that absent statutory requirements any effort to divide negligence into degrees
is highly impractical . .

..

Our statute, however, requires the

presence of gross negligence ....
59Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 593, 195 So. 399, 401 (1940).
60Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 49, 10 So.2d 715, 716 (1942).
61Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1955).

62Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1956). In 1853 the U.S. Supreme
Court also disapproved of the doctrine of dividing negligence into degrees. Steamboat New World v. King, 59 U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853).
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If trial judges and the highest state court are confused and handicapped in attempting to apply the guest statute, one need only
imagine the difficulties with which juries or laymen are faced. At a
trial the guest's attorney usually urges the judge to charge the jury
with those definitions believed to be most favorable to his side, and
the insurance attorney urges using those definitions he thinks most
favorable to the defense. The result is that the trial judge usually
reads to the jury most if not all the definitions that the Supreme
Court has laid down. After that the jury is, of course, more confused than ever. One injured passenger may win; another guest injured in the same car and accident may easily lose in another trial
3
before a different jury.6
Two years before the Florida guest statute was enacted into law
the Florida Supreme Court, in Williams v. Jacksonville, unwittingly
predicted the trouble which would follow such action: 64
"There is another reason why we might disregard the adjective
'gross' where it precedes the word 'negligence' in the quoted
charter provision. There is considerable authority for the view
that a division of negligence into degrees serves no useful purpose, but, on the contrary, tends to confusion and uncertainty.
In I Thompson on Negligence, Section 18, it is said: 'Such refinements can have no useful place in the practical administration of justice. Negligence cannot be divided into three compartments by mathematical lines. Ordinary juries.., are quite
incapable of understanding such refinements.' In ex parte
Priester, 212 Ala. 271, 102 So. 376, it was said that: 'The word
"gross," when used in connection with "negligence," implies
nothing more than simple negligence;' that 'gross negligence is
nothing more than negligence with the addition of a vituperative epithet.' In Laureisen v. American Bridge Company, 87
Minn. 518, 92 N.W. 475, it was said: 'Such subtleties tend to
obscure, rather than illuminate, the practical questions to be
determined and are usually avoided by the courts of this
country.' See 45 C.J. 664-671." (Emphasis added.)
Because of the uncertainties and confusion in the law the in63

See Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945); Kozak v. Ake, 147
Fla. 508, 3 So.2d 120 (1941).
64118 Fla. 671, 687, 160 So. 15, 21 (1935).
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surance companies in handling guest cases are willing to take their
chances on a favorable ruling from the trial judge; and if that fails,
from the jury; and if that fails, from the trial judge again; and if
that fails, from the higher court on appeal. Therefore, a much
smaller percentage of guest cases are settled out of court than in
automobile cases not arising under the guest statute. In spite of
the fact that the law on this subject has had ample time to become
more stabilized, the number of cases under this statute that are appealed is rapidly increasing. Within the five-year period of 1952
through 1956 there were nearly as many cases reaching the Supreme
Court that required interpretation of the Florida guest statute as
there were in the preceding fifteen-year period. The actual decisions
of the Supreme Court are often not as strict against the guest as
would appear from some of the Court's language.65 However, it is
this language that trial judges read to juries. If as a result the guests
lose, or receive only small compromise verdicts, they cannot always
afford the expense and delay of appeals and new trials even when
granted, as can the insurance companies.
This review of the judicial history of the Florida guest statute,
like previously published legal literature on the subject in each of
the three Florida legal periodicals,6 shows that the law on the rights
of an injured automobile guest in Florida has been and still is in a
most confused state. It has been applied in many respects most unfairly to the injured person. The legislature would probably have
never passed it had it foreseen the consequences. All of this should
not necessarily be regarded as a criticism of the Florida Supreme
Court. That tribunal may have made some unfortunate and unnecessary decisions, but no doubt it sincerely felt that they were essential because of the wording, nature, and peculiarities of this inherently bad statute. The Court was no doubt influenced also by
opinions rendered by courts of certain other states, especially Michigan, 67 from whose guest statute the main wording of the Florida
statute was copied verbatim. The court rulings there have been perhaps the most strict in the nation against the guest. 68 Did the in65See Note, 4 U. FLA. L.

REV. 79, 84 (1951).
66Silliman, Standard of Care Under the Florida Guest Statute, 27 FLA. L. J. 298
(1953); Note, 4 U. FLA L. REV. 79 (1951); 4 MIAmi L.Q. 219 (1950).
67See Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1955); McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla.

334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942); Garvie v. Cloverleaf, Inc., 136 Fla. 899, 187 So. 360 (1939).
6SSee Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13
IND.

L. REV. 131, 140 (1937); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 79, 83 (1951).
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surance companies urge the particular wording of the Michigan statute on an unsuspecting Florida legislature in anticipation of later
being in a better position to cite Michigan decisions to Florida courts
as precedents?
One might be inclined to attach more blame to Florida courts if
Florida were the only state where confusion, difficulties, and injustices exist, but this is by no means the case. Court decisions under
69
guest statutes of other states have produced much the same results.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has stated that applying the guest
statute "is one of the most difficult and delicate tasks imposed upon
the courts." 70 One writer has called the Ohio guest statute a "treadmill to confusion" and decisions under it a "hodge-podge of anomalies, contradictions and misnomers."71 One reason the Connecticut
guest statute was repealed was the confusion and difficulties of appli2
cation that it created.7
Regardless of the cause, the fact remains that the Florida law
as to automobile guests is in such a deplorable condition that the
only solution is to remove the source of the difficulty by removing the
guest statute. Without repeal, the situation cannot get much better
and may get worse. There are a number of injustices under guest
statutes on points not yet presented to the higher Florida courts which
these courts may later feel compelled to endorse. For example, the
prevailing view in states in which the point has arisen appears to be
that an automobile guest is still a "guest" after the driver, in effect,
falsely imprisons him by refusing his demand that because of the
operator's dangerous driving the car be stopped for him to get out. 73
And, of course, the fact that a guest had initially entered the car and
accompanied the driver reluctantly and only because the driver had
insisted upon it has been held immaterial.7 4 A mere baby has been
69See Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CA LF L. REv. 91 (1933); Mundt, The
South Dakota Guest Statute, 2 S.D.L. Rxv. 70 (1957); Notes, 18 CO.NEL L.Q. 621
(1933), 33 ORE. L. Rav. 216 (1954), 42 VA. L. REv. 97 (1956), 8 WSTERN RFS. L.
REv. 170 (1957); Comments, 5 KAN. L.REv. 722 (1957), 34 U. DEr. L.J. 169 (1956),
24 VA. L. REv. 88 (1937), 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 621 (1933). See also Note, 20 VA. L.
REv. 326 (1934).
70Turner v. McCready, 190 Ore. 28, 46, 222 P.2d 1010, 1018 (1950).
7lNote, 8 WarrmuER REs. L. Rav. 170 (1957).
72Letter from John H. King, supra note 1.
73Compare Fribourg, Guest-Host Relation Termination After Beginning of
Journey, 5 Cr.Lv.-MAR. L. REv. 101 (1956), with Note, 20 VA. L. Rav. 326 (1934).
But cf. Andrews v. Kirk, Case No. 57-457, 3d D.C.A. Fla., Oct. 30, 1958.
74Gaboury v. Tisdell, 261 Mass. 147, 158 N.E. 348 (1927).
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held to be in the same category as adults. 75 All such guests are considered legally to be "biting the hands that feed them" if compensation is sought from the driver's insurer.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR Or GUEST STATUTE ANSWERED

Let us take up one by one the arguments advanced in favor of
guest statutes and see how they work out in actual practice today.
Don't let these hitchhiker-beggarsbite the hands that feed them.
Today, because times are prosperous and because automobile
financial responsibility laws almost require it, most drivers have
liability insurance7 6 - differing from the situation in the period when
the guest statutes were passed. Therefore, injured persons with claims
against the drivers or owners of the vehicles in which they were passengers are not "biting the hands that feed them." They are actually
only requesting compensation from the insurance companies, to whom
they are not obligated in any way, and the business, purpose and
duty of whom it is - or should be - to compensate persons injured
through the negligence of the holders of their liability policies.
Moreover, in comparison with the depression era, there is now
relatively little hitchhiking. 77 Therefore, very few of the passengers
injured in private automobiles are hitchhikers or otherwise strangers
to the drivers. They are usually business associates or friends. Often
they enter the car at the request and for the benefit of the driver or
for the mutual benefit or pleasure of driver and guest. Many of the
lawyers who have handled a large volume of personal injury cases
have never had a hitchhiker seek their services.
Here are some examples 5 of actual cases in which the court on
75In re Estate of Wright, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911

(1951), and authorities

cited. In Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1956), involving an 18year-old guest, the Court stated that the guest statute "specifically excepted from
its provisions 'school children . . . being transported to and from schools' . . . and

thus, by implication, includes within its terms all other minor children." Compare
Note, 33 TEx. L. REv. 253 (1954). See also 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 124 (1958).
6
7 See Note, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 68 (1957).

77The decline in hitchhiking appears to have started in the middle and late '30's
as the result of business improvement, drivers' resistance, and laws making hitchhiking a crime. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1935, Sec. X, p. 1, col. 4; July 25, 1937, Sec. XI,
p. 1, col. 3; Aug. 4, 1940, Sec. VII, p. 2, col. 5.
7SFor others see Payne v. Fayetteville Mercantile Co., 202 Ark. 274, 150 S.W.2d
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appeal ruled as a matter of law that the injured person, or the survivor, could not recover damages for the reasons that the relationship
of host and guest existed and the driving of the host could not be
deemed to have amounted to gross negligence or willful misconduct.
A life insurance salesman induced a prosperous and influential
farmer to apply for life insurance. The farmer obtained his
own transportation to town for his examination by the company physician, following which the salesman took the farmer
to lunch and then to a certain nearby farming area the farmer
was interested in seeing. Later, as he was taking the farmer
home, the salesman lost control of his car while passing a trucktrailer on a curve at seventy miles per hour. The car went
off the pavement for a great distance and overturned, killing
79
the farmer.
A customer took his car to a garage to be repaired. He had
his father follow him in another car to provide return transportation. The repairman asked the customer, with whom he
was well acquainted, to stay and help repair the car, promising
to drive him home that evening. On the way to the customer's
home the repairman drove off the road, striking a tree, then
a power pole, breaking it off at the base and throwing the motor
thirty feet from the rest of the vehicle. The customer was
severely injured and the repairman was killed.80
Plaintiff and defendant were friends who had taken numerous
trips together, alternating in the use of their automobiles. When
plaintiff's car was used defendant purchased all the gasoline,
oil, and meals, and plaintiff made similar purchases when defendant's car was employed. On one trip in defendant's car
966 (1941); Hollenbach v. Fairbanks, 132 Colo. 216, 287 P.2d 53 (1955); In re
Estate of Dikeman, 178 Kan. 188, 284 P.2d 622 (1955); Wilcox v. Keeley, 336 Mich.
237, 57 N.W.2d 514 (1953); Workman v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St. 287, 47 N.E.2d
886 (1943); Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash.2d 426, 103 P.2d 1086 (1940). See also Mundt,
supra note 69. Since most of the Florida cases under the guest statute fail to state
in detail the facts upon which the host-guest relationship was based, cases from
other jurisdictions are given. But see Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So.2d 623 (Fla. 1956);
Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1955); Yokom v. Rodriguez, 41 So.2d 446 (Fla.
1949); McDougald v. Couey, 150 Fla. 748, 9 So.2d 187 (1942).
79Burt v. Lochausen, 244 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
SoAmes v. Seibert, 156 Ohio 45, 99 N.E.2d 905 (1951).
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with plaintiff paying all such expenses, plaintiff was injured
when defendant, at sixty to seventy miles per hour, failed to
make a curve of which he had advance knowledge.8 '
When we consider that in all of these more or less typical cases
the real defendants were probably insurance companies, there is a
hollow ring to the cry that we should prevent the "biting of the hand"
except when it is one of those comparatively rare situations in which
the biter can prove gross negligence and make it stick through all
the legal barricades, stumbling blocks, and pitfalls which lie between
the tragedy and the termination of litigation.
Without the guest statute the injured passenger and the driver
will conspire together to commit perjury so as to defraud the
insurance companies.
This argument assumes that most people, or a large proportion of
them, are willing to be dishonest. This is contrary to the opinion of
most students of human nature, who tell us that most people are
basically honest. The argument falsely assumes that defense attorneys
are generally unable to show, and juries are usually unable to discover,
when witnesses are lying. Moreover, it overlooks the fact that issues
of ordinary negligence can be decided in most cases on evidence other
than the testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant. It ignores the
further fact that in many of the most important cases at least one of
the parties is killed and is thus rendered unable to conspire.
One writer has stated, "The possibility of collusion in guest cases
is more often than not a mere figment of the insurance companies'
imagination." 82 In some cases the defendant driver or car owner may
be indifferent as to the outcome of the case- or perhaps even desirous that the guest win. This may result because he feels responsible
for having negligently caused the accident, because of sympathy for
the injured guest, or for other reasons. None of these conditions, however, necessarily spells perjury, conspiracy, or collusion. It would be
just as reasonable to assume that the testimony of interested witnesses
generally cannot be believed. For example, all plaintiffs want to
win their cases, but this does not prove that they all commit perjury.
One suspects that in guest cases, whenever the nominal defendant
SlBedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P.2d 630 (1955).
82Note, 8 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 170 (1957).
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fails to follow the more or less customary practice of acting as an advocate for his side of the controversy in preparing for the trial or in
giving his testimony, the insurer is inclined to yell "fraud."
Although there may be collusion between passenger and driver in
a few cases, this is no reason to penalize the many deserving injured
passengers. Collusion and perjury are matters peculiarly within the
province of the criminal, not civil, courts. Moreover, if the driver
and the passenger want to conspire to commit fraud they can do so
even under the guest statute. They need only state facts showing
gross negligence instead of ordinary negligence. If the facts are to
be manufactured out of thin air, this does not necessarily present a
problem to them. There is no reason to believe that there was any
substantially greater amount of collusion in Florida before passage
of the guest statute than since- nor is there any reason to believe
that there has been any large amount, in this state at least, at any time.
It has been argued that people otherwise honest will falsely conspire together in guest cases when they are close relatives. Again,
there is little if any evidence to support this contention. In any event,
comparatively few guests' claims are against their relatives. If the
purpose of the statute was to prevent collusion by relatives its application would have been, by its terms, confined to claims against relatives.
When one gets in a private automobile for a free ride he
knows or should know that he assumes the risk involved.
The ridiculousness of this argument is made apparent by the fact
that a guest statute such as Florida's applies to mere innocent, helpless babies the same as to adults.8 3 A small child cannot be expected
to know the difference between "guest" passengers and other kinds or
the meaning of "assumption of risk."
Moreover, even in the case of adults there is no more logical reason
why they should be deemed to have assumed the risks in guest cases
than in other types. Of course, even without the guest statute, an
automobile guest would be denied recovery of damages if the accident
resulted from a mechanical defect in the automobile, 4 intoxication
of the driver, or almost any other specific danger about which the
8sSee note 75 supra.

s4See Note, 2 S.D.L. Rzv. 149 (1957), also showing that the host's knowledge
of such defects can sometimes amount to willful misconduct.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1958], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
guest knew before he entered the automobile.

5

But there is no logical

or valid reason to hold that simply because one enters an automobile
he has reason to expect that the driver will be negligent. On the
contrary, it is a well-settled principle of law, based on common sense,
that until put on notice to the contrary one has the right to assume
that others will comply with the law and refrain from negligence.

6

Guest statutes reduce liability insurancerates.
They certainly shouldl If automobile owners are going to be
without the protection of normal guest coverage affecting themselves
and others, if guest coverage is going to be almost eliminated, they
most assuredly should pay lower rates. Whether they actually do is
another matter - one of considerable complexity.
Although the number of injured guests are no doubt great, they
do not constitute more than a comparatively small part of the total
picture so far as liability for damage to persons and vehicles from
automobiles is concerned. Therefore, if the policyholders really got
the benefit of reduced liability to guests, it is doubtful that it would
lessen the total amount of their annual premiums to any great extent.
In any event, would it not be better if the loss resulting from personal injury were "shared by the automobile-owning public rather
than borne by the injured person alone'?s7 If reduction of liability
is desirable in order to have reduction of insurance premiums, there
is no reason to stop with its application to guests. Liability as to all
injured persons could be limited just as logically. Of course, liability
cannot be eliminated altogether because it would be unconstitutional; 8
moreover, the liability insurance companies do not want to go this
far, as it would obviously put them out of the liability business.
If liability is going to be limited only as to a particular class of
persons, of what are guest passengers guilty which causes them to
merit such discrimination? And do not most policyholders feel as
great, if not a greater, sense of responsibility toward their own guests
than toward others? In other words, if liability is going to be limited
855A AM. JUR., Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§787, 805 (1956); Campbell,
Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin, 1943 Wis. L. REV. 180; Note, 20 VA. L. REV. 326
(1934).
86See 5A AM. JUR., Automobiles and Highway Traffic §204 (1956); 3 FLA. JUR.,
Automobiles §93 (1955).
87Mundt, supra note 69, at 75.
SsSee 5A AM. JUR., Automobiles and Highway Traffic §512 (1956).
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by statute, do policyholders really prefer to have it limited as to their
guests rather than as to some class of strangers?
Since every policyholder and every person is himself a potential
injured guest, the policyholder, by paying lower premiums, is really reducing coverage upon himself, his family, his friends, and everyone
else. Most policyholders who fully understand the situation would
prefer to have normal rules of negligence apply to automobile guests even if it should result in higher premiums.
But would it? Do guest statutes really produce lower insurance
rates? In an attempt to find the answer to this question the writer
sent letters to the state insurance departments in each of the fortyeight states requesting the average rate in each state. Most officials
replied that because of widely varying rates, as determined by classifications and territories within their respective jurisdictions, average
rates were not available. However, thirteen states gave average, statewide bodily injury, private passenger car rates based on schedules
drafted by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, which is
used by all or nearly all stock companies, for $5,000/$10,000 limits of
coverage, all in effect on August 15, 1957. Those rates were as follows:
States Having a Guest Statute
Florida
Kansas
Texas
Utah
Vermont

$27.04
30.08
20.15
24.30
43.00

States Having No Guest Statute
Louisiana
Maine
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Tennessee

$31.50
21.73
32.25
31.56
60.59
27.85
36.98
29.42

One thing is clear and undisputed. Generally speaking, rates tend
to be lower in sparsely populated areas and higher in places of dense
population. More people mean more cars, and more cars mean more
accidents per car. It is not surprising, therefore, that the highest
average given was from New York, where the overwhelming majority
of people live in or very near the world's largest city, and that the
lowest were from Maine and Texas, which have many areas where
one can drive an automobile for hours without even seeing another
vehicle.
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Note that the Florida rates are closest to those of Pennsylvania,
which has no guest statute and is more densely populated than Florida.
Another interesting comparison is that of the "twin states" of New
Hampshire and Vermont. The rates in the former, which has no
guest enactment, are substantially lower than those of the latter, a
guest statute state. It is not intended to suggest that any rates are
higher because of guest statutes, but there certainly appears to be no
discernible trend, to say the least, toward lower rates in jurisdictions
having such laws.
In an attempt to get information from all of the states the writer
again wrote to each state, this time asking for all rates by classifications
and territories for their respective jurisdictions in the $5,000/$10,000
bracket. This information, or most of it, was supplied by twenty-two
states only.
Information was received from eight of the Southern states.8 9
Three of these eight, Florida, Alabama, and Virginia, have guest
statutes. The rates of North Carolina, which has none, appear to be
lower than those of any of the eight states. The rates of Louisiana
tend to be slightly higher than the others. Otherwise, the rates of
these states, whether with or without guest statutes, appear to be
fairly close together, except that in the territories with the highest
rates the rates of Florida are the highest by a wide margin.
Over the nation as a whole the rates of states without restrictions
on liability to guests compare favorably with those having such restrictions. There may be a guest statute state here and there which
appears to have lower rates than a similar state without such a law,
but often as not it will be discovered that rates for property damage,
or for commercial vehicles, or both, are also lower in these states.
Of course, guest statutes do not apply to commercial passengers, nor
is it conceivable that they could logically affect property damage rates.
One can only conclude that liability insurance rates, which not
only may vary widely from one state to another having similar laws
but also in various territories within individual states, are determined
primarily if not entirely by factors other than the presence or absence
of guest statutes. Either (1) the smaller number of guest claims paid
in guest statute states does not appreciably affect the vast, over-all
costs of operation of liability insurance companies; or (2) there is a
substantial reduction in such costs but the savings are not being
passed on to the policyholders; or (3) substantial savings are passed
89Ala., Fla., Ky., La., Miss., N.C., Va., W. Va.
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on but are necessarily spread among so many policyholders that the
effect on them individually is minor if not insignificant.
WHY THE GUEST STATUTE SHOULD BE REPEALED

We have thus seen that the arguments advanced in favor of guest
statutes are invalid -at least today. We have also seen that the confusion, uncertainties, difficulties, and manifold injustices resulting
from court decisions under the Florida guest statute constitute perhaps the biggest problem in the field of tort law in the state, and that
they can be alleviated only by repeal.
In addition, the principle that an automobile driver should not
be held responsible to his guest for failure to use ordinary care is
basically unjust and unsound, and has been so regarded by most
authorities. 90 As one appellate court has stated: 91
"The gross negligence doctrine is based upon the assumption
that . . . one who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously

should be subject to a lesser measure of obligation than one who
enters upon such an undertaking for pay ....

The doctrine

has been rejected in most states and has been subjected to severe
criticism ....
In all events, the principles inherent in the doctrine are difficult in their practical application to instant cases;
it has been very largely through statutory enactment that the
doctrine has survived .... The fact that the guest pays nothing
for riding with the owner furnishes no reason why the negligence of the latter should be excused."
The guest statute was a radical departure from the common
law. Prior to its enactment a driver owed a duty of reasonable
care to his guest in Florida and in all but a very few states. 92 What
is unreasonable about requiring reasonable care? If anything, the
requirement is not strict enough. The Florida Supreme Court has
frequently declared an automobile to be a dangerous instrumentality,
and that owners and operators are charged with knowledge of this
90PROSSER, TORTS 149 (2d ed. 1955); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 91 (1933); Mundt, supra note 69; Notes, 33 ORE. L. Rav. 216 (1954); 20
VA. L. REv. 326 (1934); 34 U. Da-. LJ. 169 (1956); 24 VA. L. Rav. 88 (1937).
9lMayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1940).
92Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1950), and cases cited; 42 C.J.,
Motor Vehicles §1056 (1927).
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fact.93 Some courts have stated that "the highest degree of care," or
"great care," toward guests and others is required in the operation
of an automobile. 94 The problem of automobile accidents and the
fatalities and serious injuries resulting therefrom has become more and
more critical with the passing of the years. Every twenty-three seconds
an American is injured and every twelve minutes one is killed in an
automobile accident. 95 Guest statutes to the contrary, the trend of
the law has been toward attempts to cope with this problem. This
trend has been accompanied by a similar tendency toward reducing the
effects of all types of personal catastrophes in the lives of individuals
through social security, unemployment benefits, health insurance,
workmen's compensation, and the like. For example, all states now
have some form of financial responsibility law pertaining to automobile owners, which laws at least indirectly induce the owners to
carry liability insurance. 96 Courts are in most respects becoming more
and more inclined to ignore or liberalize technical rules and narrow
legal principles and to enhance the opportunity of a person injured
through someone's negligence to recover damages. 97 The guest statute
is thus contrary to the well-founded trend of the times. These are
no doubt additional reasons why not a single state has adopted a
guest statute since 1939. Such statutes reduce rather than promote
individual security, and they grant a license for negligent driving,
the conduct nearly all other applicable law is designed to prevent or
penalize.
Twenty jurisdictions have apparently not found it necessary or
desirable to have a special law limiting the liability of guests.98 These
jurisdictions include some of the largest (New York, Pennsylvania)
and some of the smallest (Rhode Island, District of Columbia). They
are equally varied in location: Maine, Louisiana, Arizona, \,Iissouri,
and North Carolina. There is no reason to believe that their laws in
93E.g., Stuyvesant Corp. v. Stahl, 62 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1952); see 3 FLA.. JOR., Automobiles §90 (1955).
94Weil v. Kreutzer, 134 Ky. 563, 121 S.W. 471 (1909); Thompson v. Gipson, 277
S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1955); Brewster v. Barker, 129 App. Div. 724, 113 N.Y. Supp.
1026 (4th Dep't 1909); Hahn v. Anderson, 326 Pa. 463, 192 AtI. 489 (1937).
95
Note, 8 WESTERN REs. L. REv. 170 (1957), citing NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
ACCIDENT FACTS (1956).
9GNote, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 68 (1957).
9
7See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1955).
9SAriz., Conn., D.C., Ky., La., Me., Md., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.Y.,
N.C., Okla., Pa., R.I., Tenn., W. Va., Wis.
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this field are based upon conditions peculiar to them.
Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution
provides:
"All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person
for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and
justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
Nevertheless, the practical effect of the guest statute and court
rulings under it is that in most cases it is impossible, and in the others
extremely difficult, for a negligently injured automobile guest to recover damages in court. This violates at least the spirit of the Florida
Constitution and of the basic principles of American jurisprudence.
There is neither logic nor justice in singling out an automobile
guest for such treatment. If a driver negligently strikes his worst
enemy, a vagrant, an escaped convict, or anybody else standing in or
beside the road or in another automobile, the driver can be liable for
failure to use reasonable care. He is not liable for failure to use such
care if he carelessly injures his benefactor, friend, business associate,
or anyone who happens to be an invited guest in the driver's automobile.
A driver is even liable for failure to use reasonable care toward a
trespasser whose presence in the automobile is known to the driver.99
Thus, if a person gets into an automobile without the driver's permission and an accident occurs, the wrongdoer may recover damages
from the negligent driver, even if the driver has previously ordered
the trespasser not to board the vehicle.100 It is only when the trespasser's presence is unknown that liability is limited to instances of
wanton and willful misconduct.01 In other words, a known invited
guest has less protection than a known trespasser!
Attempts have been made to show a legal basis for the law set forth
in guest statutes by comparing it to the law of bailments.' 0 2 If a person agrees to take care of a chattel for the owner's sole benefit and
without compensation, he is responsible for gross negligence only.10 3
99Cf. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1955), 9 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 106 (1956).
zOObid.
loilbid.
1o2Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917); 5A Am.
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §498 (1956).
1o3See 8 C.J.S., Bailments §28 (1938); 4 FLA. JUR., Bailments §9 (1955).
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This rule, which is probably the result of historical accident, has been
strongly criticized.10 It has produced so much confusion and so many
variations that it has been disregarded by a growing number of
courts.105 Be that as it may, there is an obvious difference between
taking care of human life and taking care of property. In one guest
06
case Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme Court stated:
"When Motes picked up the Crosbys to transport them to
Bassett's Dairy, he imposed a serious responsibility on his hospitality. If he had picked up a horse or dog the responsibility
might have been much reduced but our Christian, democratic
tradition places so much emphasis on the worth of human beings that a grave penalty is eminent if we negligently kill or
maim one."
1
The appellate court of a sister state has declared: 07

"[W]hen the owner of the automobile starts it in motion, he,
as it were, takes the life of his guest into his keeping, and in the
operation of such car he must use reasonable care not to injure
any one riding therein with his knowledge and consent. It
will not do to say that the operator of an automobile owes no
more duty to a person riding with him .

.

. than a gratuitous

bailee owes to a block of wood." (Emphasis added.)
It will not do to say it -but the guest statutes have said it, nevertheless.
It is easy for a great many people to take an uninterested or indifferent attitude toward the problem of injuries from automobile
accidents- until such injuries happen, as well they may, to themselves or persons close to them. However, few situations are more
unjust than that in which a person suffers months or years of pain
and loss of income, and perhaps is left with a permanent and serious
physical handicap, from an automobile accident clearly caused by
the negligence of another-yet he is unable to recover damages.

1o4EIliott, supra note 90; Note, 33 Oar. L. REV. 216 (1954).
1056 AM. JUR., Bailments §252 (1950).
'orMotes v. Crosby, 65 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1953).
1olMunson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 30, 148 N.E. 169, 174 (1925).
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CONCLUSION

Repeal of the guest statute would tend to bring back order,
equality, and harmony in the field of Florida automobile tort law.
It would get the Florida Supreme Court "off the hook." It would
enable guests' claims to depend upon logic, not luck; on justice, not
judicial jargon; on equity, not enigma. It would afford a much
needed protection for every member of the public, since every person is a potential injured guest.
About the only source of opposition to repeal is the liability insurance companies- but what oppositionl They will fight tooth and
nail and spend truly enormous sums of money, just as they did in
sponsoring guest statutes, in opposing any effort for their repeal, which
they stoutly maintain would cost them nothing, since they would
just increase the insurance rates. But in order to please the liability
insurance companies shall deserving injured persons continue to be
penalized because they happen to be guests, because when injured
they happen to have been an acquaintance inside rather than a
stranger outside an automobile, because there was once a depression
and hitchhiking was common, because a few drivers and guests may
possibly engage in collusion? To appease these special interests must
an injured guest, in order to recover damages, continue to prove
worse driving than if he were a trespasser, misconduct as great or
greater than necessary in order to send the operator to prison for as
long as twenty years? To satisfy these powerful corporations must
there continue to be chaos in the courts, must the security of every
citizen who rides in another's automobile continue to be illogically and
unnecessarily jeopardized? These are vital issues before every member of the Florida legislature at every session, whether the issues are
actually raised or not.
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